Finding #4: Failure to Negotiate
The Quote
“Negotiation was not seriously pursued as an alternative to the use of force.”
Source: Commission Report, Findings section
What the Commission Found
What Didn’t Happen:
- No good-faith negotiation attempts in weeks before May 13
- No professional mediators brought in
- MOVE 9 family members not consulted as potential intermediaries
- Community leaders not engaged to facilitate dialogue
- No ultimatum with realistic timeline and consequences
- No consideration of long-term siege as alternative
What Did Happen:
- Ultimatum delivered day of operation
- MOVE refused; police immediately escalated to force
- No pause to reconsider when MOVE didn’t surrender
- No attempt to negotiate even after hours of gunfire
- Operation proceeded as if violence was inevitable
Commission’s Analysis: Officials assumed negotiation would fail, so they didn’t seriously try. They treated force as the only option rather than last resort.
Why Negotiation Wasn’t Tried
Official Reasons Given:
- MOVE was “irrational” and wouldn’t negotiate
- Prior attempts had failed
- Public pressure demanded immediate action
- Warrants needed to be served
Real Reasons (Per Commission Analysis):
- Election year political pressure on Mayor Goode
- Police wanted revenge for 1978 Officer Ramp death
- Officials wanted to “send message” to MOVE
- Negotiation seen as weakness, force as strength
- MOVE 9 demand for release seen as non-negotiable
What Could Have Been Done
Alternatives Commission Identified:
- Long-term siege – surround house, wait them out (they needed food and water eventually)
- Professional hostage negotiators (despite no hostages, techniques applicable)
- MOVE 9 family members as intermediaries
- Community mediators trusted by both sides
- Federal mediators with no local political stake
- Time – there was no emergency requiring immediate action
Why Alternatives Weren’t Pursued: Political will didn’t exist. Officials wanted MOVE gone, preferably dramatically. Negotiation takes time. Bombs are quick.
Why This Matters
Every use of deadly force requires exhausting alternatives first. That’s basic Constitutional law. That’s basic police procedure. That’s basic morality.
They didn’t try. Children died. No one was charged.
Finding #5: Children Were Known to Be Present
The Quote
“The presence of children in the MOVE house was known to city officials and should have been a decisive factor in the decision-making process.”
Source: Commission Report, Findings section
What Officials Knew
Before May 13:
- Intelligence reports confirmed children living in house
- Surveillance documented children’s presence
- MOVE made no secret of having children in residence
- Number of children estimated at 4-6 (actual number: 5)
During Operation:
- Witnesses reported seeing children in windows
- Police radio traffic acknowledged children present
- Officers at scene confirmed knowledge of children
Mayor Goode’s Knowledge:
- Testified he knew children were in house
- Stated he believed they would be safe
- Could not explain why he believed this given use of bomb and 10,000 rounds
Police Commissioner Sambor’s Knowledge:
- Confirmed knowledge of children
- Stated “we can’t let children be used as shields”
- Proceeded with operation that killed all five children
What “Should Have Been Decisive” Means
The Commission found that children’s presence should have changed the entire operation. Specifically:
Should Have Meant:
- No bomb under any circumstances
- Extreme caution with gunfire
- Extended negotiation to secure children’s safety
- Involvement of child welfare services
- Federal involvement if necessary
- Accepting longer timeline to save children’s lives
What It Actually Meant:
- Nothing changed
- Bomb still dropped
- 10,000 rounds still fired
- Fire still allowed to burn
- Five children still died
The “Human Shield” Argument
Officials’ Claim: MOVE was “using children as human shields,” therefore officials couldn’t be blamed for children’s deaths.
Commission’s Response: Even if true (disputed), presence of children requires extra caution, not justification for extreme force. Police have duty to protect children even when parents/guardians act irresponsibly.
Legal Standard: Police can’t kill children just because their parents won’t surrender. Full stop.
Why This Matters
Tree Africa was 14.
Delisha Africa was 13.
Netta Africa was 12.
Little Phil Africa was 13.
Tomaso Africa was 9.
They knew. They dropped the bomb anyway. They let the fire burn anyway. All five children died.
And no one was criminally charged.
That’s not an oversight. That’s a choice. That’s the choice to value officials’ immunity over children’s lives.
Finding #6: The Fire Decision
The Quote
“The decision to let the fire burn was grossly negligent and reckless, and showed an utter disregard for the lives of the occupants and the safety of the neighborhood.”
Source: Commission Report, Conclusions section
The Critical 45 Minutes: Timeline
5:27 PM – Bomb Drops:
- Explosive detonates on roof
- Fuel stored on roof ignites
- Fire starts immediately
- Firefighters positioned and ready
5:30 PM – First Decision Point:
- Fire Commissioner Richmond confers with Police Commissioner Sambor
- Decision made: “Let it burn”
- Stated reason: destroy bunker completely
- Firefighters ordered to stand down
5:30-6:00 PM – Fire Spreads:
- Flames spread through MOVE house
- Smoke visible from blocks away
- Some firefighters reportedly question order
- No firefighting efforts undertaken
6:00 PM – Fire Breaches Walls:
- Fire reaches exterior walls of 6221 Osage Avenue
- Adjacent houses begin catching fire
- Wind carrying embers down block
- Point of no return approaching
6:15 PM – Firefighting Finally Begins:
- Richmond finally orders crews to engage
- By now fire has spread to multiple structures
- Water pressure insufficient (unrelated equipment issue)
- Fire already out of control
6:15 PM – Midnight:
- Firefighters battle blaze for hours
- Two full city blocks engulfed
- 61 homes ultimately destroyed
Commission’s Analysis of the Decision
What Richmond and Sambor Claimed:
- Believed fire would destroy bunker without spreading
- Thought water would be ineffective against fuel fire
- Wanted to ensure bunker completely destroyed
- Mutual decision between Fire and Police Commissioners
What Fire Experts Testified:
- Fire would likely have been contained if fought immediately
- Water is effective on fuel fires when properly applied
- 45-minute delay was difference between 1 house and 61 houses
- Standard firefighting procedure is to attack immediately
- No legitimate fire service reason to delay
What Commission Concluded: Decision was not based on fire suppression expertise. It was based on desire to “finish the job” – to completely destroy MOVE’s fortification even at risk of neighborhood destruction.
Why the Decision Was “Grossly Negligent”
Elements of Gross Negligence Found:
- Conscious Disregard: Officials knew fire could spread but chose to let it burn anyway
- Deviation from Standards: No fire service protocol supports letting residential fire burn
- Foreseeable Harm: Fire spreading to wooden row houses was entirely foreseeable
- Children at Risk: Officials knew children were in burning house; let it burn anyway
- Property Destruction: Knowingly risked (and caused) destruction of neighbors’ homes
The Human Cost
In the House:
- 11 people burned to death
- 5 were children ages 9-14
- Evidence suggests some may have tried to escape but were trapped
In the Neighborhood:
- 61 homes destroyed
- 250 people made homeless
- Lifetime savings lost
- Community destroyed
For Survivors:
- Ramona Africa suffered severe burns escaping
- Birdie Africa (age 13) traumatized for life
- Neighbors watched homes burn while firefighters stood by
Why This Matters
Fire Commissioner Richmond made a decision that destroyed 61 homes and killed 11 people. The Commission found it grossly negligent. Richmond was reassigned to a different desk and eventually retired with full pension.
That’s not accountability. That’s business as usual.