MOVE was founded in Philadelphia in the early 1970s by John Africa, born Vincent Leaphart, a West Philadelphia resident and Korean War veteran. The organization defies easy categorization. Part commune, part protest movement, part philosophical collective, MOVE rejected industrial society, government authority, and what they called “the System.” Members lived communally, ate raw food, kept stray animals, and took the surname “Africa” to express unity and Black liberation identity.

They were militant—visibly armed, confrontational with authorities, and uncompromising in their beliefs. They broadcast political messages through loudspeakers at all hours and fortified their homes against what they viewed as inevitable police assault. John Africa’s core teaching was simple: “We live by the law of life, not the law of man.” To MOVE members, they were revolutionary naturalists fighting an industrial system that destroyed life. They saw themselves as heirs to the Black liberation struggle, political prisoners after 1978, and martyrs willing to die rather than compromise their principles.

To Philadelphia police and city officials, MOVE was something else entirely: an urban threat group, armed extremists hiding behind ideology, a cult endangering public safety. After a 1978 confrontation that left a police officer dead and nine MOVE members imprisoned, the department never forgave and never forgot. By 1985, both sides viewed the other as evil incarnate. MOVE expected police to massacre them. Police expected MOVE to kill more officers. Neighbors on Osage Avenue, caught in the middle, complained constantly about noise, sanitation issues, and armed members on the roof intimidating residents. The collision was perhaps inevitable. But what happened on May 13 was not.

The 45 Minutes That Destroyed a Neighborhood

The critical period was 5:27 PM to 6:15 PM. At 5:27, police dropped the bomb. Fire started immediately. Meanwhile, firefighters were staged and ready, with equipment deployed and hydrants charged. Commissioner Richmond and Commissioner Sambor conferred. Their decision: let it burn. For the next forty-five minutes, firefighters watched flames spread through the MOVE house while receiving orders to wait. Some would later tell investigators they knew officials had made the wrong decision. Nevertheless, they watched anyway. At approximately 6:00 PM, the fire breached the walls of 6221 Osage Avenue.

Subsequently, adjacent row houses began catching fire. The wind was carrying embers. As a result, the point of no return was approaching. At 6:15 PM, firefighting efforts finally began. However, by then, the fire was already out of control. Water pressure was insufficient, a problem unrelated to fire department readiness but catastrophic in timing. Ultimately, the fire would burn for hours, consuming home after home down the block. Later analysis by the Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission determined that if firefighting had begun at 5:30 PM, crews would likely have contained the fire to the MOVE house alone.

In other words, the decision to wait those forty-five minutes was the difference between one destroyed house and sixty-one. The decision was not based on tactical necessity. It was based on a desire to, as officials put it, “finish what 1978 started.”

“Unconscionable”: What the Official Investigation Found

In November 1985, Mayor W. Wilson Goode; Philadelphia’s first Black mayor, who had approved the operation—appointed an eleven-member commission to investigate. The Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission, chaired by attorney William H. Brown III, spent three months reviewing documents and hearing testimony from over one hundred witnesses. When their March 1986 report arrived, it did not mince words. “Dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was unconscionable,” the Commission concluded.

Furthermore, the bombing, combined with firing “at least 10,000 rounds of ammunition at the house” and the decision to let the fire burn, constituted “unjustified and willful use of excessive force.”

The Commission found:

• – City officials acted with “gross negligence” in approving and executing the operation
• – Officials designed the plan in a “reckless, ill-conceived and hastily approved” manner
• – Police never seriously attempted negotiation
• – Officials knew children were present but did not adequately consider this fact
• – The decision to let the fire burn showed “utter disregard” for neighboring residents
• – No unified command structure existed
• – Officials dismissed alternative approaches without analysis

The report named names. Specifically, it cited Mayor Goode for approving the plan without adequate review. Additionally, it condemned Police Commissioner Sambor for reckless operation. Moreover, it faulted Fire Commissioner Richmond for agreeing to let the fire burn.

Finally, it found Managing Director Leo Brooks failed in his oversight responsibilities. The Commission made detailed recommendations: create civilian oversight, improve use-of-force policies, establish better inter-agency coordination, hold officials accountable for violations.

Then came the critical question: would anyone face criminal charges?