In forty years of covering institutional violence, I’ve learned this: if you want to understand why patterns persist, track what happens to the people responsible. When officials commit atrocities and face no consequences, you’re not looking at an anomaly. You’re looking at a system working exactly as designed.
The MOVE bombing killed eleven people, five of them children. It destroyed sixty-one homes. An official commission called it “unconscionable.” A federal jury found constitutional violations.
Not one person went to prison. Most retired with full pensions. Some are still alive.
This is their record.
PRIMARY DECISION-MAKERS
W. Wilson Goode
Position: Mayor of Philadelphia (1984-1992)
Role: Approved bombing operation
Commission Finding: Failed to adequately review plan; authorized unconscionable action
What He Faced:
- Public criticism
- Damaged political reputation
- Commission condemnation
What He Didn’t Face:
- Criminal charges
- Civil liability (sued only in official capacity)
- Loss of office (completed first term)
- Professional sanctions
What Happened:
- Ran for re-election in 1987
- Won second term despite bombing
- Served full eight years as mayor
- Left office January 1992 with full pension
- Later worked as consultant
- Currently works as minister and consultant
- Has periodically expressed regret but never faced legal consequences
Current Status (2025): Alive, age 87, living in Philadelphia area
Why This Matters: The man who approved dropping a bomb on children served two full terms as mayor and retired with honor. That’s not a bug in the system. That’s the system working.
Gregore J. Sambor
Position: Police Commissioner (1984-1985)
Role: Directed May 13 operation; publicly vowed to remove MOVE; coordinated tactical plans
Commission Finding: “Grossly negligent” in operation execution; failed to ensure adequate planning; prioritized destruction over civilian safety
What He Faced:
- Commission criticism
- Public pressure
- Political fallout
What He Didn’t Face:
- Criminal charges
- Civil personal liability
- Loss of pension
- Professional sanctions
What Happened:
- Resigned November 1985 (6 months after bombing)
- Resignation described as “mutual decision” with mayor
- Received full police pension
- No admission of wrongdoing in resignation
- Never charged criminally
- Lived quietly in retirement
Current Status (2025): Deceased (died 2017)
Public Statements: In later years, Sambor gave few interviews. When pressed, he maintained the operation was necessary and placed blame on MOVE for not surrendering. He never accepted personal responsibility for the eleven deaths.
Why This Matters: He directed an operation that killed five children. He resigned and collected a pension for the rest of his life. That’s what accountability looked like.
William C. Richmond
Position: Fire Commissioner (1984-1985)
Role: Ordered firefighters to “let the fire burn” for approximately 45 minutes
Commission Finding: Agreed to let fire burn without adequately considering consequences; failed to protect neighboring properties; decision showed “gross negligence”
What He Faced:
- Commission criticism
- Public anger (especially from displaced homeowners)
- Professional embarrassment
What He Didn’t Face:
- Criminal charges
- Personal liability
- Termination (was reassigned, not fired)
- Loss of pension
What Happened:
- Reassigned to other city duties (November 1985)
- Not terminated; remained city employee
- Later stated he made decision to let fire burn because he believed it would destroy bunker without spreading
- Claimed water would have been ineffective against fuel-fed fire (disputed by fire experts)
- Retired with full pension
Current Status (2025): Deceased (died 2020)
Public Statements: Richmond defended the “let it burn” decision in testimony, arguing that fighting the fire earlier wouldn’t have prevented spread given fuel on roof. Fire suppression experts disputed this, noting 45-minute delay was difference between one house and sixty-one houses destroyed.
Why This Matters: The fire commissioner ordered firefighters to watch a neighborhood burn. He was reassigned to a different desk and eventually retired with benefits. Property owners got pittance compensation. Richmond got a pension.
Leo A. Brooks
Position: Managing Director (chief administrative officer, 1984-1985)
Role: Coordinated inter-agency operation; supposed to ensure adequate planning and oversight
Commission Finding: Failed in oversight responsibilities; did not ensure agencies were properly coordinated; approved inadequate plan
What He Faced:
- Commission criticism
- Loss of position
What He Didn’t Face:
- Criminal charges
- Civil liability
- Loss of city pension
- Professional sanctions
What Happened:
- Resigned shortly after bombing
- No criminal charges filed
- Moved to private sector
- Worked in consulting and management
- Maintained bombing was unintended consequence of legitimate police operation
Current Status (2025): Deceased (died 2013)
Why This Matters: His job was coordination and oversight. He failed catastrophically. Eleven people died. He resigned and got a new job. That’s the cost of failure when you’re in power.
OPERATIONAL LEADERS
Lieutenant Frank Powell
Position: Philadelphia Police Department bomb squad
Role: Constructed the explosive device containing C-4 and Tovex
Commission Finding: Created improvised explosive without adequate testing or safety assessment
What He Faced:
- Professional scrutiny
- Questions about bomb construction
What He Didn’t Face:
- Criminal charges
- Departmental discipline
- Suspension or termination
- Loss of pension
What Happened:
- Continued career with Philadelphia Police Department
- No disciplinary action taken
- Never charged with any crime related to bomb construction
- Retired with full pension
Details: Powell testified that he constructed the device based on instructions from police leadership. He stated it was designed to “blow the bunker off the roof” without causing fire. The device contained military-grade explosives. It ignited fuel stored on roof, starting fire that destroyed sixty-one homes.
Powell maintained he was following orders. He was never held accountable for following orders to build a bomb and drop it on a house full of children.
Current Status (2025): Unknown; likely deceased or very elderly
Why This Matters: He built the bomb. He knew it would be dropped on an occupied house. He faced zero consequences. If you build a bomb that kills five children and face no charges, what does accountability even mean?
Detective William Klein
Position: Pennsylvania State Police helicopter pilot
Role: Piloted helicopter; dropped explosive device onto MOVE house
Commission Finding: Executed order to drop bomb as instructed
What He Faced:
- Public scrutiny
- Questions about decision to follow order
What He Didn’t Face:
- Criminal charges
- Disciplinary action
- Professional sanctions
- Loss of employment
What Happened:
- Continued career with Pennsylvania State Police
- No charges filed
- No departmental discipline
- Maintained he was following lawful orders from Philadelphia police leadership
- Retired with full pension
Details: Klein testified he was ordered to drop the device by Philadelphia police officials. He stated he trusted that the operation was lawful and necessary. He expressed some regret about outcome but maintained he had no reason to question orders at the time.
Current Status (2025): Unknown; likely deceased or elderly
Why This Matters: “Following orders” has been a weak defense since Nuremberg. Klein dropped a bomb on a residential neighborhood from a helicopter. Children were inside. He knew that. He dropped it anyway. He retired with a pension.
OFFICERS WHO FIRED 10,000+ ROUNDS
Multiple police officers, names documented in police records
What They Faced:
- Nothing
What They Didn’t Face:
- Questions about why 10,000+ rounds were necessary
- Investigation into whether fleeing MOVE members were shot
- Disciplinary action
- Criminal investigation
What Happened:
- No officers disciplined for excessive use of ammunition
- No investigation into why firing continued for hours
- No charges related to firing into occupied house with children inside
- All continued careers or retired with pensions
Why This Matters: More than 10,000 rounds fired at a row house with five children inside. That’s not suppressive fire. That’s not crowd control. That’s attempted annihilation. And not one officer faced questions about it.